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This paper tackles the question of knowing whether collateral helps solve adverse selection 
problems in transition countries. We use a unique dataset of about 400 bank loans from 16 transition 
countries. Our findings support the view of a positive link between the presence of collateral and the 
risk premium, which is in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis. This suggests that collateral 
does not mitigate adverse selection problems in transition countries. 
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There is a wide consensus regarding the problems of financing for companies in 
European transition economies. Central and Eastern Europe is the only area in the 
world where lack of financing is mentioned in the three main obstacles to business 
activity and company growth for small and medium-sized companies, as pointed out 
by Pissarides (1999). These difficulties notably result from the limited access to bank 
credit. A key issue for the access to credit is the availability of collateral. Indeed 
Bratkowski et al. (2000) mention that the probability of being granted a loan increases 
with the level of collateral offered by the firm in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland. In a similar vein, Dvorak (2004) points out that collateral requirement is the 
first obstacle in obtaining external financing for a sample of Czech companies. 
But why are collaterals required by banks in transition countries? A first 
intuitive reason is the fact that collateral allows a reduction of the loan loss for the 
bank in the event of default. It can however also be argued that collateral helps solve 
the problems resulting from information asymmetries. Namely, it would help solve 
the problem of moral hazard after the loan is granted. Indeed collateral would have a 
binding role on the borrower which favours the alignment of his interests on the 
bank’s. Furthermore, collateral would help solve the problem of adverse selection 
borne by the bank when lending, as it constitutes a signalling instrument providing the 
bank with some valuable information. Indeed, collateral helps the bank obtain private 
information owned by the borrower, as high-quality borrowers are more induced to 
  3accept to provide collateral in compensation of a low loan rate than low-quality 
borrowers are. 
The aim of this paper is to test the relevance of this latter argument, namely the 
role of collateral to mitigate adverse selection problems in transition countries. As 
collateral requirements are presented to be a major obstacle to the access to credit, this 
is a key issue in the perspective of improving the access to credit for firms in 
transition countries. We do so by using a unique dataset of 391 bank loans from 16 
transition countries extracted from Dealscan, which supplies detailed information on 
the presence of collateral and the risk premium. This dataset is exceptional in the 
sense that it provides information at the loan-level for a large sample of loans from 
different countries. 
According to the adverse selection argument, we should observe a negative link 
between the presence of collateral and the risk premium. However there is a 
commonly accepted view among bankers that riskier loans would be associated with 
more collateral. The rationale is that banks would be able to sort the borrowers from 
information they have on their quality. As a result, they would charge riskier 
borrowers with higher loan rates and require higher collateral from these borrowers. 
In accordance with this view, the scarce papers on this link in developed countries all 
conclude to a positive relationship between collateral and risk premium (Berger and 
Udell, 1990, 1995; Blazy and Weill, 2005). 
It is therefore of utmost interest to check the relevance of the role of collateral to 
solve adverse selection problems in transition countries. Indeed, the context of 
transition countries can be more appropriate for the emergence of the role of collateral 
to mitigate adverse selection (Allen and Gale, 2000; Llewellyn, 2002). These 
countries are characterized with short length of lending relationships and uncertain 
  4accounting information, both characteristics contributing to favour ex ante 
information asymmetries. In addition, there exist other means than collateral to solve 
adverse selection problems such as screening. However the efficiency of screening in 
banks from transition countries is likely to suffer from the lack of know-how of bank 
employees, owing to the short period of market economy in these countries. 
Therefore, one could expect that greater information asymmetries between the 
borrower and the lender in transition countries than in developed countries contribute 
to favour the relevance of adverse selection argument for the use of collateral in 
transition countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background on the role 
of collateral to mitigate adverse selection problems. Section 3 describes data and 
variables. In section 4, we develop the empirical results. We finally provide some 




This section presents the literature on the adverse selection argument for the use 
of collateral. We first develop the theory underlying this argument, before presenting 
the empirical tests. 
Collateral may solve the problem of adverse selection thanks to the better 
information owned by the borrower in comparison to the bank before the lending 
decision. This private information may lead to credit rationing because of the inability 
of the bank to price the loan according to the borrower’s quality (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). Therefore, high-quality borrowers have incentives to show their quality, using 
a credible signal, meaning a signal that can not be provided by low-quality borrowers. 
  5Collateral is such a signal, as it is more costly for low-quality borrowers since they 
have a higher chance of defaulting and hence of losing the collateral (Bester, 1985; 
Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Consequently, as collateral acts 
as a signalling device, it conveys valuable information on the borrower to the bank, 
which can then screen borrowers by offering the choice between a secured loan with a 
low interest rate and an unsecured loan with a high interest rate. A high-quality 
borrower will be inclined to choose the loan with a collateral as its low risk of default 
means a low probability to lose collateral and a high probability to repay interest. 
Therefore, this argument supports the view of a negative link between collateral 
and credit risk, as a secured loan would be associated with a higher quality of 
borrowers. However, the fact that collateral is associated with greater credit risk has 
gone mainstream among bankers as mentioned by Berger and Udell (1990) and 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004). The rationale underlying this argument is that banks can 
sort the borrowers from information they have on their quality. Consequently they 
charge riskier borrowers with higher rates, and simultaneously require more collateral 
from these borrowers to reduce loan loss in the event of default. Since collateral 
reduces its loss, the bank would be more inclined ceteris paribus to ask collateral from 
borrowers with a higher credit risk. This argument is commonly called the observed-
risk hypothesis. 
The existence of such an opposite hypothesis to the adverse selection argument 
makes of utmost interest the empirical tests on the link between collateral and risk 
premium. Therefore, we now tackle the question of knowing whether the selection 
adverse argument for the use of collateral is empirically validated. 
Empirical literature remains however relatively scarce on this issue. Berger and 
Udell (1990) investigate the relationship between collateral and credit risk on a 
  6sample of 1 million loans from US banks. They notably test the hypothesis that 
adverse selection matters for the use of collateral by regressing the risk premium on a 
set of loan characteristics including a dummy variable considering whether the loan is 
secured or not. The conclusion does not corroborate the adverse selection argument, 
as a positive and significant relationship is observed between collateral and risk 
premium. This finding may be explained by the fact that banks require more collateral 
from riskier borrowers who are also charged with higher loan rates, in accordance 
with the observed-risk hypothesis. 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004) focus on the determinants of the probability of 
default of bank loans on a wide set of 3 million loans provided by Spanish banks. 
Probability of default is considered as an ex post credit risk measure. As a 
consequence, they do not only test whether collateral mitigates adverse selection 
problems, but also whether collateral solves moral hazard problems. According to this 
latter argument, the presence of collateral should solve the problems of moral hazard 
after the loan is granted, as the borrower would be more inclined to take the optimal 
decisions owing to the alignment of his interests on the bank’s. The probability of 
default is explained by a set of loan characteristics including some information on the 
collateral. Three dummy variables depending on the collateralized share of the loan 
are jointly taken into account in the model. They find a greater probability of default 
for secured loans. 
Blazy and Weill (2005) extend the analysis by investigating the influence of the 
collateral type and value, taking into consideration that all types of collateral may not 
be equivalent for banks. They use a dataset of 735 bank loans on French distressed 
firms with full information on collateral. They test the three theoretical reasons for the 
use of collateral by banks (reduction of loan loss in the event of default, adverse 
  7selection, and moral hazard). Regarding adverse selection, they analyze the link 
between collateral and risk premium, by checking whether the type and the value of 
collaterals exert an influence on the relationship. They observe first a positive 
relationship between the presence of collateral and the risk premium. The inclusion of 
type and value of collaterals is done by including six variables aggregating collateral 
value according to a classification in six types of collaterals in the regressors of the 
risk premium. They find out that no collateral variable is negatively linked with the 
risk premium, while three types of collateral among the six tested are significantly 
positive, the three other being not significant. Consequently, this study also tends to 
reject the adverse selection argument for the use of collateral. 
Berger and Udell (1995) analyze a closely related issue: the role of banking 
relationships on loan characteristics. They investigate the associations among 
collateral, banking relationship and risk premium on a sample of 1 million loans from 
US banks. It provides some support on the positive association between collateral and 
risk premium, and clear evidence that firms with longer banking relationships are less 
likely to pledge collateral. Consequently, this work tends to support the view that 
collateral is associated with greater risk. On this issue of relationship lending, Harhoff 
and Körting (1998) conclude similarly on 994 loans from German banks, while 
Degryse and van Cayseele (2000)’s work on 18 000 loans from Belgian banks 
provides mixed evidence on this issue. 
Finally, the recent study from Jimenez et al. (2006) takes a broader perspective 
by analyzing a wide range of determinants of the presence of collateral. Tested 
determinants include the characteristics of the borrower with credit quality, but also 
the characteristics of the lender, the competition on the loan market and the 
macroeconomic conditions. Credit quality is related to the theories of the use of 
  8collateral by banks. It is proxied by a dummy variable taking into account the fact that 
the borrower had recently a loan in default. The authors then observe that the credit 
quality of the borrower is the main determinant of the use of collateral. 
This presentation of the literature devoted to the adverse selection argument for 
the use of collateral leads to two main conclusions. First, empirical evidence is rather 
in favour of the observed-risk hypothesis according to which riskier borrowers are 
required to provide more often collateral, in accordance with the common opinion of 
bankers. This element tends to invalidate the theoretical argument on the use of 
collateral dealing with resolution adverse selection problems. Second, studies remain 
very scarce and are limited to a couple of Western countries. Therefore, no study 
testing this possible role of collateral has ever been performed in transition countries, 
whereas their specific framework might influence the use of collateral to mitigate 
adverse selection problems. Our empirical work aims at filling this loophole. 
 
3. Data and variables 
 
We collect a sample of 391 loans from the database from the Loan Pricing’s 
Corporation’s (Reuters) Dealscan database. This database provides detailed 
information on loans to large corporations. Loans come from 16 transition countries, 
including 11 Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia) and 5 countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan). Loans were granted between 
January 1996 and August 2006. 
  9We focus on the relationship between the presence of collateral and the risk 
premium. In this aim, we proceed to regressions of the risk premium on a set of 
variables including the presence of collateral and some control variables. 
Risk premium is the difference between the loan rate and the prime rate used by 
the lender for the loan pricing. Information on risk premium is directly provided in the 
database. The presence of collateral is measured by a dummy variable (Collateral) 
equal to one whether the loan is secured or to zero else, following most works on the 
use of collateral. 
We include three control variables in the estimations. We first take information 
on loan maturity into account (Maturity). The second control variable informs on the 
loan type through a dummy variable equal to one whether the loan is a term loan or to 
zero else (Type). A term loan is defined in Dealscan as an installment loan where 
amounts repaid may not be reborrowed. Finally, we control for loan size, which is the 
amount of the tranche of the loan (LoanAmount). Indeed syndicated loans are granted 
by tranches, which can be charged with different loan rates. Dummy variables for 
each country and each year are also included in the estimations to control for country 
effects and year effects. 
Descriptive statistics are displayed in table 1. We observe that a majority of 
loans is secured (59.85 per cent). This figure is in accordance with the shares of 
secured loans in total loans observed in studies on Western European countries. 
Berger and Udell (1995) observe that 53 per cent of firm loans are secured in their US 
sample, while Blazy and Weill (2005) point out a share of 74.5 per cent of secured 
loans for their sample of loans to distressed companies. However, one has to keep in 
mind that our sample includes only large loans to large companies, which are 
expected to have a lower default risk than other companies. 
  10The average risk premium is 244.80 basis points. It has to be stressed that this 
margin is observed on large loans, as the mean loan amount is 255.63 million dollars. 
However large loans are generally expected to be granted with low loan rates, owing 
to greater competition on loan rates. This latter point suggests high margins on loans 
in transition countries (Gadanecz, 2004). Loan amounts are as expected large on 
average, owing to the contents of the Dealscan database. The maturity of loans is 
relatively short with a mean of 41.6 months. This is in accordance with the 
observation in transition countries that most loans are granted on a short-term basis. 
Finally, a slight majority of loans are term loans (53.71 per cent). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 2 summarises our sample structure, according to the country and the year. 
A notable remark is the fact that a majority of loans is originated from Russia (69 per 
cent). The breakdown by year shows an increasing number of loans with time, in 








This section displays the findings on the role of collateral to solve adverse 
selection problems in transition countries. Theoretical literature suggests that 
                                                           
3 The smaller number of loans for 2006 in comparison to 2004 and 2005 is due to the fact that we only 
have loans for 2006 from January to August. 
  11collateral may constitute a signalling instrument and consequently may help the bank 
obtain private information owned by the borrower. According to this argument, we 
should observe a negative link between the presence of collateral and the risk 
premium, as high-quality firms would be inclined to provide a collateral in exchange 
of a lower risk premium. 
To test this hypothesis, we perform the regression of the risk premium on a set 
of variables including the dummy variable for the presence of collateral. Three 
estimations are computed. The first one is done on all countries. As a large proportion 
of loans come from Russia, we perform a second estimation specifically on Russia 
and a third estimation on loans granted to borrowers from CEE countries.
4 These 
estimations allow us furthermore to investigate whether there exist some differences 
between Russia and CEE countries. 
The results of the estimations are displayed in table 3. The fit of the regressions 
is satisfactory with adjusted R² ranging between 0.0912 and 0.3810. Our major 
finding is the positive and significant coefficient of Collateral in all estimations. 
Therefore, we observe that risk premium increases when the loan is secured. This 
evidence does not support the theoretical argument according to which collateral 
helps solve the problem of adverse selection. In contrast, it corroborates the observed-
risk hypothesis according to which banks would ask for more collateral from riskier 
companies, which are already charged with higher loan rates. We then support the 
empirical evidence provided by Berger and Udell (1990), who also observe a positive 
link between the presence of collateral and risk premium on US loans. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
                                                           
4 There are not enough loans granted to borrowers from CIS countries other than Russia for a specific 
estimation on these countries. 
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Turning to the control variables, we observe a negative and significant 
coefficient for LoanAmount in estimations for all countries and for Russia. This 
supports the view that greater loans are charged with lower loan margins. This finding 
is consistently found in the literature (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1990). It can result either 
from the existence of economies of scale in lending, or from the fact that larger 
borrowers are considered as safer customers. The only other significant control 
variable is Type, which is positive in the estimation for Russia. This suggests that term 
loans are charged with higher margins than other loans in Russia. This is not a 
surprising result, as term loans can be considered as riskier than other loans owing to 
the stronger commitment it represents for the lender. The last control variable, 
Maturity, is not significant in all three regressions. One could have expected a 
positive link between the maturity of the loan and the risk premium, as a greater 
maturity is generally associated with a higher risk and therefore with a higher risk 
premium. A possible explanation is the relatively low variance of the maturity of the 
loan. Indeed 90 per cent of the loans in our sample have maturity ranging from 1 to 5 
years. This relatively low range of maturities may limit the differentiation in risk 
premium for the loans. 
As great differences between countries can be observed in terms of creditor 
rights of access to the assets put up as collateral, a potential criticism to our 
estimations may be the fact that a cross-country investigation ignores these 
differences. To solve this concern, two possibilities exist. The first one is to replace 
cross-country estimations by single-country estimations. However, single-country 
estimations are not possible in our framework as national samples are small, with the 
notable exception of the Russian sample. It must nevertheless be stressed that the test 
  13performed on the Russian sample confirms our main findings. Therefore this test is a 
first answer to the potential problem of cross-country differences in creditor rights. 
The second one consists in including country-level variables taking into account 
creditor rights of access to the assets put up as collateral in the tests. Therefore, cross-
country differences in creditor rights are controlled in our regressions. In this aim, we 
perform two new estimations on our sample of all countries. We add alternatively two 
variables to the set of explaining variables in our model. Both come from the dataset 
developed by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). The first variable, Creditor, is 
an index aggregating four aspects of creditor rights. It ranges from 0 (weak creditor 
rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). The second variable, Contract, is the number of 
days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. It measures the number of days it 
takes to enforce a simple debt contract, and therefore informs on the quality of law 
enforcement. 
The estimations with these legal variables are presented in table 4.
5 We observe 
that the inclusion of the legal variables does not change the results. Indeed the 
variable Collateral keeps a positive and strongly significant coefficient. Furthermore 
the coefficients for other variables also have the same sign and significance. 
Therefore, the positive and significant effect of Collateral is robust to the inclusion of 
differences in terms of creditor rights and of law enforcement for the access to the 
assets put up as collateral.
6
 
                                                           
5 We exclude Estonia from the sample in these additional estimations, as we have no information on 
legal variables for Estonia in the dataset developed by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). 
6 As reported by Spamman (2006) for La Porta et al. (1998)’s shareholder protection index, some 
measures of legal environment might suffer from inconsistency or coding. However, as Spamman 
(2006) pointed it out, his results regarding the shareholder protection index can not be generalized to 
legal data in other studies, including Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) from which we obtain 
information for Creditor and Contract variables. Furthermore, we do not include measures of 
shareholder protection in our estimations. Therefore, our conclusions should not be exposed to his 
criticisms. 
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Consequently, our tests do not support the view that collateral helps mitigate 
adverse selection in transition countries. This finding is observed in CEE countries 
and Russia taken separately. It is in accordance with the results obtained in developed 
countries by notably Berger and Udell (1990) for US loans or Blazy and Weill (2005) 
for French loans. 
Following these latter studies, we provide evidence in favour of the observed-
risk hypothesis according to which banks charge greater loan rates and ask for 
collateral to riskier companies. 
However a key difference is that our findings are obtained in transition 
countries where the institutional context and the development of the banking industry 
are undoubtedly different. Namely, we could have expected that adverse selection 
hypothesis would gain more support in transition countries than in developed 
countries because of the greater information asymmetries between the borrower and 
the lender in these latter countries. Indeed, the length of the relationship between the 
borrower and the lender which contributes to reduce ex ante information asymmetries 
is shorter on average in transition countries than in developed countries, owing to 
their short history in market economy
7. Furthermore, the efficiency of screening, 
which constitutes an alternative means to solve adverse selection problems, is 
expected to be lower in transition countries owing to the weaker know-how of bank 
employees, which may also be the result of a short period of market economy. 
                                                           
7 One might argue that in transition economies lender-borrower relationship history might be longer 
due to the fact that many firms and banks are former SOEs and state banks. Such claim would hold if 
the majority of lender-borrower pairs are from the same country (i.e. lender and borrower have the 
same nationality). In our sample, only 5.9% of the lenders per deal are from the same country as the 
borrower. Therefore, we can consider that the history of relationship between lenders and borrowers is 
short for the vast majority of the loans in our sample. 
  15Nonetheless, the observed-risk hypothesis is also supported in transition 
countries, relative to the adverse selection hypothesis. This finding suggests that even 
in transition countries in which information asymmetries could be expected to be 
stronger than in developed countries, banks are able to sort the borrowers from 
information they have on their quality. Therefore, even in these countries, banks are 
able to charge the riskier companies with greater loan rates and a more frequent 
collateral requirement. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This research has analyzed empirically whether the presence of collateral 
contributes to mitigate adverse selection problems in transition countries. This 
argument has been theoretically developed in the literature to explain the widespread 
use of collateral (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). 
It has however not received empirical support in developed countries. One can 
therefore wonder whether this argument could be supported in the specific framework 
of transition countries in which ex ante information asymmetries may be exacerbated. 
In this aim, we have investigated the link between the presence of collateral and 
the risk premium on a sample of about 400 loans from 16 transition countries. Our 
conclusion clearly rejects the argument that collateral is used in transition countries to 
solve adverse selection problems. Indeed we observe a positive relationship between 
the presence of collateral and the risk premium, in opposition with the argument of 
the collateral as a signalling instrument. This finding is however in accordance with 
the observed-risk hypothesis, according to which banks would be able to sort 
borrowers from information they have on quality. It is of greatest interest to observe 
  16that our results are in accordance with former studies on developed countries which 
all find out a positive link between collateral and risk premium. 
As the resolution of adverse selection problems does not seem to be a 
satisfactory motivation for the widespread use of collateral, one should test the 
relevance of both other motives for the use of collateral, the reduction of the loan loss 
in the event of default and the resolution of moral hazard problems in transition 
countries. It would notably be of interest to know whether these motives play a more 
significant role in transition countries than in developed countries. 
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  19Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
   Mean  Std  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Collateral (in %)  59.85  49.08  0  1 
Risk premium (in basis points)  244.80  162.78  11.75  1037.50 
Maturity (in months)  41.63  34.61  4  216 
LoanAmount (in million USD)  255.63  821.70  6.00  13,391.00 
Type (in %)  53.71  49.93  0  1 
 
  20Table 2 : Sample by country and by year 
 
Country  Number of loans  Year  Number of loans 
Azerbaïdjan 1  1996  12 
Bulgaria 2  1997  39 
Croatia 8  1998  11 
Czech Republic  7  1999  23 
Estonia 2  2000  10 
Hungary 21  2001  25 
Kazakhstan 15  2002  28 
Lithuania 3  2003  45 
Macedonia 1  2004  56 
Poland 24  2005  97 
Romania 13  2006  45 
Russia 272     
Slovakia 13     
Slovenia 7     
Ukraine 4     
Uzbekistan 1     
 
 
  21Table 3: Collateral and risk premium 
 




































Adjusted R²  0.3781  0.3810  0.0912 
N 391  270  100 
Dependent variable is the risk premium. t-statistic is in brackets. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for countries and 




  22Table 4: Collateral and risk premium: estimations with legal variables 
 
 Estimation  (1.1) 























Creditor rights  -146.751 
(0.80) 
- 
Contract -  1.453 
(0.80) 
Adjusted R²  0.3793  0.3793 
N 389  389 
Dependent variable is the risk premium. t-statistic is in brackets. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables 
for countries and years are not reported. Estimations are performed for all countries 
except Estonia. 
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